

Katja Jasinskaja
Centre for Advanced Study at the Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters

CORRECTION AS RESTATEMENT

24.02.2011, 12:30-13:00

This paper develops a uniform treatment of Corrections:

(1) John didn't go to Paris. He went to Berlin.

and Restatements:

(2) John went to the capital of Germany. He went to Berlin.

The fact that *Paris* is „replaced“ by *Berlin* in the description of the event in (1) is derived from the assumption that by default juxtaposed sentences answer the same question (Where did John go?) exhaustively: The (only) place John went to is not Paris, it is Berlin. Exhaustivity (a variety of Quantity implicature) brings in the `only' component into the interpretation of the sentences, and since the only place John went to can be either Berlin, or Paris, not both, the replacivity effect arises. The same mechanism is responsible for the inference of identity in Restatements: if the only place John went to is the capital of Germany and the only place John went to is Berlin, then Berlin is the capital of Germany.

This approach has two implications: First, since it refers to universal pragmatic processes like exhaustivity, expressing Correction by simply juxtaposing a negative and a positive sentence is predicted to be possible in all languages. Indeed, this pattern seems very widely spread. Second, the order of the negative and the positive sentence is predicted to be interchangeable:

(3) John went to Berlin. He didn't go to Paris.

is replacive just as much as (1) is. In contrast, the order in Corrections marked by *but*, *sondern*, etc. is not interchangeable in the same way.