

REVISITING ‘AND’: THE DYNAMICS OF ADDITIVITY

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We reconsider and enrich data collected and presented in (Lang,1984) and (Zeevat and Jasinskaja, 2007) to propose a new analysis of the conjunction ‘*and*’ under which a sentence of the form *A and B* implicates that:

- *A* and *B* target some common conclusion *C*
- Given *A*, *B* is not redundant in helping to derive *C*

Our analysis is motivated by the fact that ‘*and*’ can connect two segments, the last of which is a defeasible consequence of the first or is an elaboration of the first conjunct. This possibility goes against Z&J’s analysis, which stipulates the disjointness of the conjuncts connected by ‘*and*’ in answering a single question. As defined, it is not evident to see how their solution accounts for the disjointness of conjuncts related by *Elaboration*, or how a defeasible consequence of the first conjunct can answer a question in a different manner from the first conjunct.

To answer these issues, we define a notion of *conduciveness*, based on a probability measure in an epistemic model and inspired by Merin (1999)’s Bayesian conception of argumentativity. We then argue that ‘*A and B*’ conventionally implicates that both *A* and *B* are conducive to a common proposition, and that the conduciveness of *B* must not be exhausted by the knowledge of *A*. This condition correctly excludes cases where *A* logically entails *B*, but accounts for the cases where *B* is non-monotonically inferred from *A*.